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VALUATION OF THE MORTGAGOR'S INTEREST
IN EMINENT DOMAIN
The general rule for the valuation in eminent domain of property
subject to split ownership is to first value the property as an unen-
cumbered fee, and then to apportion the award between the owners
of the various interests.' The fact that property is subject to a mort-
gage or a lease is immaterial with respect to the total amount of com-
pensation paid by the condemnor. In a recent series of cases,
however, in which the federal government has acquired Wherry Act
housing on military installations, the government has condemned
only the mortgagor's interest by assuming an unpaid mortgage bal-
ance. The only method of property valuation available in these cases
was the capitalization of income method, and the courts were faced
with the unique question of when in the capitalization process to give
consideration to the unpaid mortgage balance.
The Wherry Housing Act of 19492 was enacted by Congress for the
purpose of increasing the supply of rental housing accommodations
available -to military and civilian personnel on military installations,
To insure success the Act was drafted in such a way as to make the
program attractive both to the owner-sponsor who constructed the
project and the mortgage banker who supplied the capital. The proj.
ects were constructed on government land subject to long term leases
to the owner-sponsor at nominal annual rents. In arranging the fi-
nancing for these projects, the Federal Housing Administration esti-
mated the original cost of construction, and then authorized federally-
insured mortgages representing approximately ninety per cent of this
estimated cost. The owner-sponsors were subject to Federal Housing
Administration regulations in such matters as rents, charges, capital
structure, rate of return, and method of operation. In 1952, Congress
enacted the Capehart Act,3 announcing a new policy with regard to
military housing. Under the Capehart Act, the federal government,
and not government-sponsored private enterprise, was to construct
and operate housing projects on military installations. Therefore,
government acquisition of all Wherry housing projects located on mili-
tary bases where construction of Capehart housing had been ap-
1. 1 L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DoM mN 461 (1953).
2. 12 U.S.C. § 1748 (1964).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1594(a) (1964).
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proved was made mandatory in order to avoid competition between
the Wherry projects and the newer Capehart projects.
As a result of this mandate in the Capehart Act, extensive litigation
has arisen involving the valuation of the Wherry projects. The courts
are now in agreement that capitalization of net income is the appro-
priate method for determining the fair market value of the projects.4
The main problem facing the courts has been to determine at what
point in the capitalization process to consider debt service (amortiza-
tion of the mortgage). The owner-sponsors have maintained that
net income should be capitalized before the deduction of debt
service, the balance of the unpaid mortgage then being subtracted
from the total figure. The government has maintained that the net
income should be capitalized after the deduction of debt service.
The general rule on this point is that no deduction can be made
for amortization in determining the income to be capitalized for valu-
aton purposes.5 The reason for the rule is obvious when one conceives
of a property whose entire earnings are being paid out in interest
and amortization of a mortgage. 6 In such a case, if the debt service
were deducted before the capitalization of income, the absurd result
would be reached that the value of the property is zero. The courts
in the Wherry cases, however, have not uniformly followed this rule.
As many courts have deducted the debt service before the capitaliza-
tion as after, and no Wherry case has ever been reversed because of
the use of one system or the other.
The most recent Wherry case is Sill Corp v. United States7 Accord-
ing to pretrial agreement, the capitalization issue was given to the
jury, which apparently decided to use the government's method of
capitalizing income after the deduction of debt service., On appeal,
4. Reproduction cost less depreciation has been rejected in United States v.
Benning Housing Corp., 276 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1960); comparable sales has been
rejected in United States v. Tampa Bay Garden Apartments, Inc., 294 F.2d 598
(5th Cir. 1961).
5. J. BONBRIGHT, THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY 910 (1937).
6. The rule is derived from cases involving valuation for property tax assess-
ment. Note the similar theories behind valuation for property tax assessment and
eminent domain, as opposed to valuation for income tax purposes where the oppo-
site rule is applied. See De Luz Homes v. County of San Diego, 45 Cal. 2d 546,
290 P.2d 544 (1955).
7. 343 F.2d 411 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840 (1965).
8. The government experts, capitalizing after deduction of debt service, arrived
at valuations of $294,000 and $302,000. The owner's experts, capitalizing before
deduction of debt service, arrived at valuations of $1,100,000, $1,111,000, $1,200,-
000 and $1,300,000. The jury awarded a verdict of $302,000.
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed,
holding neither method so palpably erroneous that it was legally in-
admissible. It is a consideration of this particular problem, possibly
peculiar to Wherry cases, that has led courts, as in the Sill case, to
capitalize after the deduction of debt service, contrary to the general
rule.
This problem is a result of the fact that the government, upon tak-
ing possession, assumes the unpaid mortgage balance. In most emi-
nent domain cases involving split ownership, the property is first
valued as an unencumbered fee. The award is then apportioned be-
tween the owners of the different interests. Thus if the property were
subject to a mortgage, the debt service, or amortization of the mort-
gage, would not receive consideration until after the valuation of the
property.9 In the Wherry cases the government has in effect forced
this apportionment before the valuation of the property by assuming
the unpaid mortgage balance.
The courts in the Wherry cases have attempted to solve this prob-
lem by examining the personal position of the owner-sponsor. As
previously stated, the reason for the rule that income is to be' capi-
talized before deduction of debt service is obvious when one conceives
of a property whose entire earnings are being paid out in interest and
amortization of a mortgage. The court in the Sill case indicates that
the fallacy of this argument in Wherry cases may be that the only
interest taken is the possessory right in a lease. Unlike the usual case,
the owner-sponsor of a Wherry project can acquire no equity through
the amortization of the mortgage. The nature of his estate is purely
possessory-the right to the income after the discharge of all of the
burdens. Because of this fact, many of the courts in the Wherry cases
have refused to use the general rule; instead, they capitalize the income
after the deduction of debt service1O
It is at least questionable whether the use of one system or the
other is critical to the owner-sponsor's amount of recovery. The
Wherry cases have been decided on many different issues involving
all three variables in the use of the capitalization of income method
of valuation, i.e., capitalization rate, income to be capitalized, and
economic life of the project. In United States v. Certain Interests in
9. Note the similarity between this method of valuation and the apportionment
and capitalization of net income before the deduction of debt service.
10. Another problem of lesser importance that has led the courts away from
the general rule has been the avoidance of the usual problem of extinction of in-
-terest because of the continuation of the project after condemnation.
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Property in Cumberland County," the lower court capitalized income
before the deduction of debt service. On appeal, the government did
not argue that the income should be capitalized after the deduction
of debt service, but instead argued that the District Court has erred in
substituting its own finding that the project had an economic life of 35
years for that of a court-appointed commission which found that the
project had an economic life of 30 years. The Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit affirmed, stating that the evidence supported a
finding that the economic life of the project was 35 years.
In United States v. Certain Interests in Property in Monterey
County,12 the income was capitalized after the deduction of debt ser-
vice. Again, the owner-sponsor did not argue that the income should
be capitalized before the deduction of debt service, but instead argued
that the government's evidence concerning comparable sales was in
violation of a pretrial agreement that the method used in valuation
of the property would be capitalization of income and not comparable
sales. The District Court correctly distinguished between the use of
comparable sales as direct proof of the value of the condemned prop-
erty, and the use of the sales price of comparable property by an expert
to arrive at a realistic and just capitalization rate for the property
condemned. The Court held that the government's use of comparable
sales was for the latter purpose, and not in violation of the pretrial
agreement.
These two cases aptly demonstrate two of the many issues on which
the Wherry cases have been decided. Because of the presence of so
many issues, the courts have reached widely divergent results, depend-
ing mainly on which issues are argued. These results vary from a per
unit award of $1,029 to a per unit award of $3,603. 3 Although all of
these decisions were reached in cases involving similar Wherry hous-
ing projects, several of the cases have completely ignored the mortgage
amortization problem, and in no case has there been a reversal be-
cause of the use of one method or the other for handling mortgage
amortization.
Chief Judge Arraj in United States v. Certain Interests in Property
in Adams County' 4 states that "it seems clear to the court that either
11. 296 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1961).
12. 186 F. Supp. 167 (N.D. Cal. 1960), aff'd, 308 F.2d 595 (1962).
13. United States v. Certain Interests in Property in Cascade County, 205 F.
Supp. 745, 755 (D. Mont. 1962).
14. 239 F. Supp. 822, 824 (D. Colo. 1965).
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system could be used, and the choice of one system over the other
does not seem critical. Rather, it is the choice of the rate and time
factors that is important." This statement may be correct with regard
to tie Wherry cases because of the great number of variables involved
in valuing the Wherry projects. The courts, however,, must strive
for a definite answer to the mortgage amortization problem because
of its obvious importance in any condemnation case in which the con-
demning agency condemns only a partial interest. In such a case the
personal income loss of the condemnee may be quite a bit less than
the "market value" of the condemned property, and courts must de-
termine which of these methods constitutes "just compensation." It is
only after this question is resolved that the courts will be able to
handle the mortgage amortization problem effectively.
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